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MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMATIC RISK IN 
THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Investors describe the uncertainty of a business’s success or failure as risk, and managers 
must monitor this risk because it affects a companies’ cost of capital, market value and 
ultimately shareholder wealth. Using regression analysis, this study reexamined how the 
systematic (market related) risk of a company’s common stock is linked to corporate behavior 
and financial performance. The results suggest that properly investing excess cash flow in 
operating assets and high asset turnover may lower systematic risk and, depending on a 
company's stage of development, director turnover may increase systematic risk. 
Key Words: systematic risk, restaurant industry, operating leverage, financial leverage 
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INTRODUCTION 
The significance of beta to a firm’s value has resulted in researchers investigating the 
relationship between beta and a firm’s financial variables for various industries (see Table 1) and 
for restaurant companies in particular (Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 2002; Shin & Kim, 2007). Large 
or small, restaurants are risky businesses with many forms of operating and financial risks 
impacting their ability to stay in business. Among the risks are: changes in consumer tastes and 
discretionary spending patterns; changes in general economic conditions; public safety 
conditions or concerns such as outbreak of mad cow disease or the SARS epidemic; 
demographic trends; the cost of food products, labor and energy; competition; and governmental 
regulations.  
These risks put investments in restaurants at considerable risk, resulting in many business 
failures, despite the fact that the restaurant industry is booming. According to Angelo and 
Vladimir (1998), 50% of new restaurants went into bankruptcy after one year, and 85% of them 
went into bankruptcy after three years. Sales in the restaurant industry were $42.8 billion in 
1970, increased to $185.1 billion in 1986, to $308.2 billion in 1996. In 2006 sales reached $537 
billion marking the fifteenth consecutive year of real sales growth for the industry (National 
Restaurant Association, 2007). Sales are expected to reach $565 billion in 2007 and represent 4% 
of the U.S. gross domestic product. One important reason for this steady growth is people tend to 
eat out more as their incomes increase and their personal time becomes a valued commodity 
(National Restaurant Association, 2007). 
Therefore, managing risk requires a focused and dedicated management team that 
understands the determinants or causes of uncertainty.  This would enable them to implement 
policies and strategies that would help reduce risk, and thereby maximize firm value and 
shareholders wealth (Brenner & Smidt, 1978).  
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Risk and Return 
Total risk of a security can be partitioned into two parts: nondiversifiable risk and 
diversifiable risk. Diversifiable risk, or unsystematic risk, represents the risk associated with 
random events (such as strikes, regulatory actions) that can be eliminated through diversification 
of investments. Nondiversifiable risk, or systematic risk, is the shareholder-specific risk closely 
tied to market factors (such as economic, political, and social events) that can not be eliminate 
through diversification.  Therefore, systematic risk is a stock's volatility due to the market's 
volatility; or the covariance with the overall market’s movement.  Systematic risk is donated as β 
(or beta) (Goetzmann, 2006). 
The concept that investment return should increase as risk increases is a basic tenant of 
financial management. To maximize a company’s share price, management must learn to assess 
two key determinants: risk and return. Each financial or operational decision presents certain risk 
and return characteristics, and the varying combinations of these factors has an impact on share 
price. Risk, or the chance of financial loss, significantly affects a business’ investment 
opportunities and the wealth of its owners, while return is the total gain or loss experienced on an 
investment over a given period of time. 
The basic theory that relates risk and return for all investors is the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). The CAPM links systematic risk (beta) and stock return and determines the expected return a 
potential investor requires on an investment (Fama, 1976). The higher the systematic risk, the 
more an investor expects. The formula used to describe the CAPM relationship is:  
Ke = Rf  + β (Rm – Rf)        (1) 
Where 
Ke  = investor’s required rate of return 
Rf  = risk-free interest rate 
β = beta coefficient 
Rm = return on the market portfolio 
(Rm – Rf) = market risk premium  
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The Beta Coefficient 
Systematic risk, or the beta coefficient, is a market sensitivity index; it measures the 
volatility of a given stock relative to the market (e.g. the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock 
Composite Index). This tendency of an individual stock to move with the market constitutes risk, 
because the market fluctuates, and these oscillations cannot be diversified away (Huo & Kwansa, 
1994). 
Some stocks have virtually no systematic risk. These stocks are not influenced as much 
by the general market, but rather company specific factors; for example, the food service 
industry has a low beta and is relatively isolated from market ups and downs. Other stocks, such 
as high technology companies, have high betas and their stock returns are strongly influenced by 
the general market. As indicated market related risk results from factors that systematically affect 
all firms, such as recession, inflation, and high interest rates (Hartviksen, 2004).   
Deriving Beta from Return Data 
Beta is derived by regressing a stock’s historical returns on overall market returns. The 
quantified slope of the linear regression is generally positive. A steep slope indicates greater 
volatility to market variations, while a shallow slope indicates less exposure to the market. For 
example, a stock with a beta of 2.0 will be twice as responsive to the market as a stock with a 
beta of 1.0. 
Company Characteristics and Restaurant Risk 
Financial distress, potential insolvency and reduced shareholder wealth are the ultimate 
results of mismanaged risk, and studies have identified factors that may help managers and 
investors predict a company’s financial troubles, leading to a better understanding of the 
company’s risk. Weston and Brigham (1990) proposed that both asset structure (operating leverage) and 
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financial structure (financial leverage) are factors that affect a firm's systematic risk (beta). Generally 
hospitality firms are fixed-asset intensive and highly-leveraged (Huo & Kwansa, 1994).  
Operating leverage is the percentage of fixed costs in a company’s cost structure. 
Generally, the higher the operating leverage (higher fixed costs than variable costs), the more a 
company's income is affected by fluctuation in sales volume (Huo & Kwansa, 1994).  For 
example, a restaurant company with higher operating leverage will generate greater operating 
income in times of sharply increasing sales than will a company with a lower operating leverage 
(higher variable costs). Conversely, a restaurant company with lower operating leverage will 
perform better when sales revenue decreases. The more significant the volume of sales, the more 
beneficial the investment in fixed costs becomes, which means the company does not have to pay 
as much additional money for each unit produced or sold. However, the down side to this high 
operating leverage is if a high percentage of a firm’s costs are fixed, they do not decline as 
demand decreases, this can increase the company’s business risk (Huo & Kwansa, 1994).  
Financial leverage is the additional variability in earnings due to the use of debt. The 
greater the degree of financial leverage, the greater the fluctuations (positive or negative) in 
earnings per share. The common stockholder therefore, is required to endure greater variations in 
returns when the firm's management chooses to use more financial leverage rather then less (Huo 
& Kwansa, 1994). 
In identifying the determinants of systematic risk or beta, previous studies have examined 
the relationship between beta and liquidity, debt leverage, operating efficiency, profitability 
dividend payout, firm size, sector analysis and growth using multiple regressions with beta as the 
dependant variable (see Table 1).  
• In the hotel industry, seven variables were examined as important factors of systematic 
risk: leverage, growth, firm size, liquidity, efficiency, profitability, and dividend payout 
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ratio. Leverage ratio and growth were positively related to systematic risk, while firm 
size had a negative relationship with systematic risk. Correlations between the other 
variables and systematic risk were not found (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).  
• Current ratio, leverage ratio, assets turnover ratio, and profit margin ratio were 
investigated as potential determinants of systematic risk in 35 U.S casinos. Only asset 
turnover was negatively related to a firms’ systematic risk; no relationship was found 
with any of the other variables (Gu & Kim, 1998). 
• Systemic risk (beta) was compared with liquidity, dividend payout ratio, leverage, return 
on assets, and growth opportunities for 55 companies in the restaurant industry (Borde, 
1998). The levels of liquidity and growth opportunity were found to be positively related 
to systematic risk while dividend payout ratio and return on assets were negatively 
related. Leverage ratio was almost irrelevant with risk, which was not expected as 
leverage is generally believed to be related positively with risk (Borde, 1998). 
• A study of 72 restaurant firms using liquidity, dividend payout ratio, leverage, return on 
assets, and growth opportunities found systematic risk had a negative relationship with 
assets turnover but had a positive relationship with liquidity (Gu & Kim, 2002). 
• Shin and Kim (2007) investigated systemic risk (beta) with liquidity, dividend payout 
ratio, leverage, return on assets (profitability), and growth opportunities in the restaurant 
industry. They concluded liquidity, return on assets, and growth opportunities were 
related to a firm’s systematic risk (beta). Dividend payout and leverage were not 
statistically significant and therefore unsuitable factors in explaining beta. 
Although their research did not relate to systematic risk, Barber, Ghiselli, Deale and 
Whitham (2007) studied the relationship between company financial performances on CEO 
turnover in the restaurant industry. They concluded that negative stock and accounting 
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returns can be a good predictor of turnover. The assumption was that a board of directors 
would act (relatively) quickly to avoid the risk of further financial or market deterioration 
due to poor executive and company performance. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A number of these studies have examined the relationship of certain financial 
determinants and beta, using different time periods and number of restaurants. This current 
research is to follow the studies performed by Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and 
Kim (2007) on restaurant firms’ systematic risk (beta) determinants. There are various reasons 
that support this study’s reexamination of restaurant beta determinants.  
First, according to the study by Brode (1998) the 52 restaurant companies used had a 
mean annual growth in EBIT of 5.1% percent during the period 1992 - 1995, while in the study 
by Gu and Kim (2002), which used 75 restaurant firms, had a mean negative annual growth in 
EBIT of 18.7% from 1996 - 1999. In the study by Shin and Kim (2007), they sampled 42 
restaurant companies and reported a mean annual growth of EBIT that was a negative 42.7% 
during the period 2001 – 2005. In contrast, the 64 restaurant companies in this study reported a 
mean annual growth in EBIT of 4.1% during the period 2000 – 2005. The fact that all three of 
the previous studies examined different time periods and had different sample sizes could be one 
of the main reasons in explaining the differences and warrants further analysis. 
Second, the restaurant industry has continued to undergo restructuring since 1995. 
According to Gu and Kim (2002), 40% of the restaurant firms tested by Borde (1998) were non-
existent by their study in 1999, due to either bankruptcy or mergers. This current study contained 
an updated sample and only included 14 (or 27%) of the original restaurant companies used by 
Borde (1998). Finally, Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) nor Shin and Kim (2007) considered 
the possible effect of executive manager turnover on systematic risk. 
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As a result of their findings on beta determinants, this study used only the 4 ratios found 
by Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and Kim (2007) as identifying factors that affect 
systematic risk in restaurant companies. In addition four new variables – return on equity (ROE), 
interest coverage, earnings before income tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) as a 
percentage of revenue and Executive Management and Director Turnover were used in this 
study. No previous studies were found that tested these new variables. 
These new variables were chosen for the following reasons. First, return on equity has not 
been previously used to model the potential impact on risk, yet return on equity plays an 
important role between return and risk (Arditti, 1967; Bromiley, 1991). Bromiley (1991) 
concluded that low performance results in a company's income stream becoming more risky and 
thereby lowers future performance. 
Second, it has been suggested that interest coverage has an impact on the amount of risk a 
company may take (Bromiley, 1991), which in turns influences the markets perception of the 
company’s market risk. Again, Bromiley (1991) proposed that wasted or unused resources - 
“slack” could result in potential low performance, and suggested two measures. The first is the 
debt-to-equity ratio, which reflects a lack of potential slack, and the second is the interest 
coverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of income before taxes and interest charges to interest 
charges, which indicates the presence of potential slack. Firms with additional resources can take 
advantage of opportunities and have more strategic options available than firms without 
additional resources. For example, a corporation with larger income relative to interest charges is 
in a better position to take on additional debt to grow and expand the company than a corporation 
with lower income relative to interest charges. 
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Third, EBITDA is commonly used as a key measure of financial health, particularly by 
lenders to determine debt service capabilities. In a study conducted by Baker and Ruback (1999) 
it was found to provide the most precise estimate of value depending upon the industry.  
Finally, there were no studies found that considered Executive Management and Director 
Turnover and the impact on risk (beta). However, in a study by Barber et al. (2007), they 
determined that a change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a company 
and that financial performance impacts CEO turnover in restaurant companies.  
As discussed earlier, financial distress, potential insolvency and reduced shareholder 
wealth are the ultimate results of mismanaged risk, and studies have identified factors that may 
help managers and investors predict a company’s financial troubles, leading to a better 
understanding of the company’s risk. Therefore, this study has selected key executive turnover as 
a possible determinant of risk (beta) because of the instability turnover can cause in the market 
and resulting perception of financial risk.  
METHODOLOGY 
To examine how the market related risk of a company’s common stock is linked to 
corporate behavior and financial performance this study used data for the six years beginning 
2000 through 2005. The companies included were derived from the March 4, 2006 Nations 
Restaurant News Stock Index of 73 publicly-traded U.S. restaurant and other food service related 
companies (“NRN Companies”). Using proxy statements (DEF 14A) filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, data on the composition of boards of directors and executive 
management were gathered.  Company financial determinants were collected from the Mergent-
online database and beta from Value Line Research. Value Line beta is calculated by regressing 
the weekly changes in the price of the stock against weekly percentage changes in the NYSE 
over a 5 year period; no adjustments are made for dividends in this calculation.   
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The variables used in the beta determinant model were selected according to whether 
they measured profitability (ROE or ROA), liquidity (Quick Ratio), debt management (debt to 
assets, leverage, and interest coverage) and asset management (asset turnover). To increase the 
explanatory power of the beta determinant model, the four new variables discussed earlier were 
used. The first variable was return on equity which was calculated using net income divided by 
the average stockholders equity for the period. 
The second variable, interest coverage, is a calculation of a company's ability to meet its 
interest payments on outstanding debt. Interest coverage is equal to earnings before interest and 
taxes for a time period, divided by interest expenses for the same time period. The lower the 
interest coverage, the larger a company’s debt burden and the greater the financial risk to 
investors. The Third variable was change (or turnover) in Executive Management and Boards of 
Directors. Executive Management and refers to those in a position to influence the strategic, 
operational and financial decisions of a company and included the following individuals: 
Chairman/CEO, CEO, COO/President and CFO (“Executive Management”). The final variable 
was Earnings Before Income Tax, Depreciation and Amortization as a percentage of revenue for 
a given period. 
Turnover was determined by tracking Executive Management for each of the NRN 
Companies during the sample period and computing a simple percentage change. For example, 
turnover across top 5 officers of a firm was measured by comparing the Executive Management 
of the firm across year’s t and t-1. If an officer appears in t on the DEF 14A but never appears 
again in the DEF 14A as an employee of the firm, we assume that the officer has quit and we 
hence code turnover as 1/5 or 0.2.  
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Data Analysis 
After reviewing the data, a number of companies were removed from the sample because 
of U.S. bankruptcy filings and/or because they issued stock under an initial public offering and 
complete public information was not available. There were no mergers or acquisitions during this 
sample period that would have impacted this analysis. As a result, data were available for 64 
companies (average) during the sample period (“NRN Sample Companies”).  
Testing of the NRN Companies life cycle and size followed the method used by Barber et 
al. (2007), which grouped the companies according to gross revenue (using quartiles as the 
grouping points). For example, group one companies had the lowest gross revenue, and the 25% 
quartile separated it from Group 2, the next largest, etc. This was done in order to examine the 
relationship between turnover and company size. 
This follows in part the research of Hanks, Watson, Jansen, & Chandler (1993) in which 
companies can be clustered according to annual sales, growth rate and organizational structure. 
Although their research did not address public companies, it is commonly accepted that once 
public, the expectations of investors, lenders and the market in general may create new growth 
and organizational demands for company Directors, Executive Management and other key 
employees – which undoubtedly affects turnover.  Support for using gross revenue as a surrogate 
for company size was assessed via correlation; the relationship between gross revenue and 
market capitalization for all NRN Companies was highly significant, r = .9425 (p<.0001). 
The data were analyzed using statistical procedures including descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, and regression (SAS release 9.1 TS level 02M0), similar to the studies by 
Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and Kim (2007). The descriptive analysis focused on 
variable means. Beta was a dependent variable, while liquidity, leverage, ROA, ROE, EBITDA 
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of revenues, interest coverage, asset turnover and executive management and director turnover 
were the independent variables. 
The study's methodology examined the relationship between beta, the market-derived 
measure of risk described above, and various company-specific financial characteristics using 
regression analysis. A common problem associated with regression using cross-sectional or time 
series data is that the regression model may be impacted by heteroscedasticity, which violates the 
constant residual variance assumption of regression. This can be avoided by using the weighted 
least-squares (WLS) regression procedure, as suggested by Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller 
(1988) and Borde (1998). The weights are the reciprocals of the absolute values of the residuals 
from a first-path ordinary least-squares regression. Using this method, the OLS regression model 
shown below is estimated first. 
RISK(beta) = α0 + α1 Liqi + α 2 Levi + α 3 ROAi +  α 4ROE + α5 EBITDA%i + α 6 Intcovi + α7Astrn + α8Turn + U   
 
Where: 
α0 = intercept 
Liq = liquidity, defined as the average ratio of cash plus short-term securities to total 
assets for firm j over the study period. 
Lev = leverage, defined as the average ratio of common equity to total assets for 
firm j over the study period. 
ROE = represents Earnings from Continuing Operations divided by average Total 
Equity and is expressed as a percentage. 
 
ROA = operating returns, defined as the average ratio of net income to total assets 
for firm j over the study period. 
 
EBITDA% = Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization 
divided by total revenues. 
Intcov = calculated by dividing a company's earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) of one period by the company's interest expenses of the same period: 
Astrn = take the total revenue and divide it by the average assets for the period 
studied. 
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Turn = Turnover was determined by tracking Executive Management for each of 
the NRN Companies during the sample period and computing a simple percentage 
change. 
After the OLS regression model was determined, two WLS models were derived. The first 
model included all eight independent variables to establish the initial assessment and role of each 
variable in the model. The second model followed the forward selection regression method as 
proposed by Stevens (1986). This was done to refine the model so only significant variables were 
remaining. 
The forward selection procedure considers the first variable to enter the model as the one 
with the largest correlation with the dependant variable. If the variable is statistically significant, 
then the second variable with the largest semi partial correlation with the dependent variable is 
considered. If the second variable is significant, then a third variable with the next largest semi 
partial correlation is considered until all independent variables are considered. At some stage, a given 
variable will not make a significant contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable and the 
procedure is terminated. This study followed the cutoff significance value used by Borde (1998) and Gu 
and Kim (2002) of 0.05 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the NRN Companies. The mean systematic risk 
(beta) for all NRN Companies is 1.20 with a range of -0.20 to 3.06. Group four had the highest 
mean beta (1.5) and group one the lowest mean beta (0.89). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Correlations among the variables are presented in Table 3. Return on assets has the 
highest negative correlation with beta, while interest coverage has the highest positive 
correlation. High positive inter-predictor variable correlations were also found between EBITDA 
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and ROA (0.64, p<.0001), ROE (0.32, p=.0099), as well as between asset turnover and ROE 
(0.26, p=.0419) liquidity (-0.28, p=.0287) and EBITDA (-0.35, p=.0059). Therefore, 
multicollinearity among independent variables was checked for in the regression model. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The WLS regression model results are presented in Table 4. Asset turnover is the 
dominant determinant of restaurant beta as indicated by its highest statistical significance level 
(t-value=-1.74, p<.01). The direction of the asset turnover beta (-0.282) is consistent with 
previous studies (Gu & Kim, 1998; Logue & Merville, 1972), suggesting that by efficiently 
managing assets, turning assets over quickly can lead to a lower restaurant beta. The other 
significant variable in the model is liquidity (t-value=-1.92, p<0.01). The direction of liquidity is 
negative, confirming the relationship found by Logue & Merville (1972) and Moyer & Chartfield 
(1983) that a higher ratio can indicate less risk. Although the variables, executive turnover and 
directors turnover are not significant at the 0.05 level in the model, their positive direction was 
expected. The greater the turnover rates among these two groups, the greater the impact on a 
company’s stock price, and ultimately beta.  
To check for the presence of multicollinearity variance inflation factors (VIF) were 
determined. Variance inflation factors below 10 generally indicate multicollinearity is not a 
major concern (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989). Similarly, VIF greater than 4 is an 
arbitrary, yet common cut-off criterion for deciding when a given independent variable displays 
high multicollinearity (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). Table 4 presents the VIF with no variable 
above 10 and only one variable, Director Turnover was close to 4.0 (3.98); therefore it appears 
that multicollinearity may not be a problem.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 5 presents the results of the forward selection WLS regression model for the NRN 
companies and by the company’s stage of development. The NRN companies’ stage of 
development followed the method used by Barber et al. (2007), which grouped the companies 
according to gross revenue (using quartiles as the grouping points). The variance influence factor 
(VIF) values are well below the cutoff of 10, with two variables just under the VIF of 4.0 as 
suggested by (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002), indicating that there is no serious concern about 
multicollinearity issues in this regression model (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989).  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the sample of NRN companies, liquidity (β=-0.152) and asset turnover (β=-0.179) 
were the only significant variables to enter the model, with asset turnover the most significant. In 
the smaller companies (groups one and two), director turnover significantly affected beta. This 
suggests that the relationship between turnover and beta may be related to factors associated with 
firm size and/or life cycle. In other words, director turnover has affected the systematic risk of 
smaller restaurant firms than larger firms.  
Despite the need to grow these companies in size beyond their geographic niche, 
shareholders and stock markets are not tolerant of poor accounting and market returns, 
particularly when these smaller companies may be more dependent on the right leadership. This 
supports previous studies where logistic regression found a relationship between turnover and 
poor market and accounting returns (Barber, et al., 2007; Conyon & Florou, 2002). 
In the largest companies (group four), ROA was the significant predictor of beta. These 
companies have large and usually diverse asset mix. Managing and operationalizing these assets 
to generate the highest returns may result in these companies facing a smaller probability of 
failure and therefore helps lower risk.  
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CONCLUSION 
This study reexamined determinants of systematic risk (beta) of 64 restaurant firms from 2000 
through 2005. Using the WLS regression analysis, restaurant firms' systematic risk correlated 
negatively with assets turnover and negatively with liquidity. The findings suggest that efficient use of 
existing restaurant assets is the key to risk reduction and firm value enhancement. The results of this 
study confirm Borde's (1998) and Shin and Kim (2007) regarding liquidity and Gu and Kim (2002) 
regarding asset turnover.  
These results indicate that if a firm has the ability to meet short-term financial obligations, this 
could lower risk. Given the goal of restaurant firm executives is to maximize the wealth of their 
shareholders; they may take consider these findings when formulating corporate strategies. If 
restaurant firms can not avoid retaining too much cash and near-cash assets in excess of their 
short-term liabilities and investing this excess in efficient operating assets, they should consider 
distributing this excess to shareholders as dividends (Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 1998). 
Managing for value is not a mysterious process. However, it does require a long-term 
focus on returns, not quarter to quarter changes in earnings per share. The “value manager” 
perspective is characterized by the ability and willingness to act on opportunities to create 
incremental value, while recognizing that each new investment project earning an appropriate 
return above the company’s opportunity cost of capital should be accepted. Focusing on 
shareholder value is not a one-time task to be done only when outside pressures emerge. 
As discussed earlier, Barber et al. (2007) determined that turnover of Executive 
Management and Directors impacted a company’s financial performance. This study disclosed 
an interesting finding relating to turnover and beta. Turnover of directors was a significant 
predictor of beta, suggesting that the relationship between turnover and beta may be related to 
factors associated with firm size and/or life cycle. This was the case for smaller companies 
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within groups one and two. Directors at these stages of growth and development are critical 
“strategists” in steering a company through the hazards of the initial stages of “post-listing” 
market share development and brand identification. Until the companies mature and gain market 
share, with resulting efficiencies gained in operations with greater net income, perceived risk by 
the market may be expected. Therefore, high director turnover at the early growth stage may 
signal poor financial performance for the company, thereby impacting the market perception of 
the company’s financial health and its resulting beta. 
As mentioned earlier, the different sample sizes and different time periods may be the 
reason that this study differed from the other studies exploring risk in the restaurant industry. The 
restaurant industry is ever changing and dynamic, with new restaurants opening and many older 
ones either closing or merging with competitors.  
In summary, the results of this study confirm the need to manage financial ratios. The 
linkage between financial variables and beta ultimately impacts shareholder wealth and the 
viability of the company. This study confirmed the results of other research that liquidity, ROA 
and asset turnover are significant predictors of beta (Borde, 1998; Logue & Merville, 1972; 
Moyer & Chartville, 1983 and Gu & Kim, 1998). It also demonstrated that beta can be impacted 
differently by each of these predictors, depending on the company’s stage of growth (life cycle). 
The other seemingly important variables, interest coverage, ROE, leverage and EBITDA were 
not important predictors of beta.  
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Table 1. Summarized Results of Previous Research 
Financial Determinants  Relationship to Beta Researchers Proposed Reason(s) 
Positive 
Jensen (1984) High liquidity increases cost 
of free cash flow and raise risk 
of wasteful use of cash assets. 
Negative 
Logue & Merville 
(1972); Moyer & 
Chartfield (1983) 
High liquidity, suggests low 
short-term debt. 
Positive 
Borde (1998) Valuable resources are not 
being invested in high-earning 
operating assets. 
Not significant either way Gu & Kim (1998)  
Liquidity 
Positive Gu & Kim (2002) 
Available resources not 
invested in operating assets 
(lost opportunities). 
 
Negative Shin & Kim (2007) 
If a firm has ability to meet 
short-term financial 
obligations, this could lower 
risk. 
Debt Leverage Positive 
Kim, Gu & Mattila 
(2002); Borde, 
Chambliss & Madura 
(1994);Gu & Kim 
(2002) 
Debt financing creates 
financial risk. Using less debt 
can reduce systematic risk. 
ROA Negative Borde (1998); Logue & Merville (1972) 
Ability to manage property 
profitably. 
 Negative Shin & Kim (2007) Ability to manage property profitably. 
Operating Efficiency 
(asset turnover) Negative 
Logue & Merville 
(1972);Gu & Kim 
(2002) 
High efficiency in using 
revenues to generate revenues 
helps lower risk. 
Dividend Payout Negative Borde (1998); Logue & Merville (1972) 
Returns from dividend 
perceived by investors as more 
certain than through higher 
stock price 
 Not significant either way Gu & Kim (2002); Shin & Kim (2007 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Six Years 2000 to 2005 
Mean Std. 
Group 
Variable One (n=16) Two (n=16) Three (n=16) Four (n=16) 
NRN 
Companies 
(n=64) 
NRN 
Companies 
(n=64) 
Beta 0.89 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.7 
ROA -3.5 2.1 6.8 3.1 2.0 12.9 
ROE 11.6 0.4 11.3 12.2 9.0 31.9 
Liquidity 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.6 
Leverage 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
EBITDA/Revenue 4.1% 7.0% 15.2% 13.5% 9.8% 7.3% 
Asset Turnover 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.5 
Interest Coverage -4.5 3.9 31.2 11.7 9.9 651.1 
Executive Turnover 5.4% 5.0% 2.0% 5.3% 4.4% 0.1 
Director Turnover 2.8% 2.0% 1.8% 2.5% 2.3% 0.1 
Note: ROA = return on assets; ROE=return on investment; EBITDA=percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization over revenue. 
Group Minimum beta Maximum beta 
   One -0.20 2.28 
   Two 0.13 3.06 
   Three 0.39 2.85 
   Four 0.80 2.96 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlations Between Variables (n=64) 
(n=64) Beta ROA ROE Liquidity Leverage EBITDA Asset Turnover 
Interest 
Coverage 
Executive 
Turnover 
Director 
Turnover 
Beta 1.00          
ROA -0.17 1.00         
ROE -0.13 0.57* 1.00        
Liquidity -0.04 -0.06 0.01 1.00       
Leverage 0.06 -0.11 0.13 -0.07 1.00      
EBITDA -0.01 0.64* 0.32* -0.09 -0.01 1.00     
Asset Turnover -0.12 0.04 0.26** -0.28* -0.03 -0.35* 1.00    
Interest Coverage 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.11 -0.08 0.10 0.11 1.00   
Executive  Turnover -0.003 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.08 1.00  
Director Turnover -0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.01 0.22 -0.11 0.32 0.05 0.29 1.00 
* Significant at p=.01. ** Significant at p=.05. 
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Table 4. WLS Regression Model With all Variables 
(n=64) Coefficient t-statistic VIF 
Intercept 1.936 3.17** NA 
ROA -0.003 -0.20  
ROE 0.0002 0.03 3.44 
Liquidity -0.278 -1.92* 3.19 
Leverage 0.595 1.18 1.23 
EBITDA -0.009 -0.41 2.49 
Asset Turnover -0.282 -1.74** 2.14 
Interest Coverage 0.0003 1.91* 1.10 
Executive Turnover 0.062 0.18 1.43 
Director Turnover 1.545 0.51 3.98 
**=Significant at 0.01 level; *=Significant at 0.05 level. R2=0.2683, Model F=3.30 
(Significant at 0.05 level) 
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Table 5. Forward Selection WLS Regression Model for NRN Sample and by Proposed Life Stage 
NRN Sample (n=64) Coefficient t-statistic VIF 
Intercept 1.707 11.62* NA 
Liquidity -0.152 -2.03** 1.04 
Asset Turnover -0.17986 -2.97* 1.04 
Group One (n=16) 
Intercept 1.313 8.50* NA 
Director Turnover 14.886 5.05* 3.78 
Group Two (n=16) 
Intercept 6.040 13.27* NA 
ROA -0.086 -7.47* 1.00 
Asset Turnover -2.877 -9.26* 2.68 
Director Turnover 9.593 5.42* 3.43 
Group Three (n=16) 
Intercept 2.470 28.16* NA 
Asset Turnover -0.7931 -12.39* 1.01 
Executive Turnover 7.895 19.59* 2.74 
Group Four (n=16) 
Intercept 2.369 15.74* NA 
ROA -0.0960 -6.46* 1.00 
*=Significant at the 0.01 level. R2 = 0.4018, Model F-statistic=6.49 (significant at the 0.01 level). Group 
one R2 = 0.9074. Group two R2 = 0.9954. Group three R2 = 0.9959. Group four R2 = 0.8741.  
 
